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Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the evidence and applied literature on 
medical  migration.  Since  migration  of  health  workers  influences  the  provision  of 
health services, or put differently since an expansion of health provision in the short-
run is often only possible via the importation of health workers, and impacts upon the 
well-being of the population, the paper includes a survey of applied macroeconomic 
models on changes in health and/or health care provision. The general equilibrium 
economic impacts of endogenous changes in health provision on the health of the 
population, well-being and effective labour supplies are relatively little researched in 
the literature.  Receiving even less attention is medical brain drain, a process likely to 
have associated adverse (positive) health and welfare consequences for developing 
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1. Introduction 
Health  workers  migrate  from  developing  to  developed  countries  to  better  their 
economic or social situation immediately or for the purpose of career development. 
The  incentives  to  migrate  typically  involve  a  combination  of  “push  factors” 
(unsatisfactory  working  or  living  conditions  in  the  country  of  origin)  and  “pull 
factors” (attractive working or living conditions, availability of positions and active 
recruitment  in  the  country  of  destination).
2  While  individual  motives  underlie  the 
observed migration flows – and in this sense are neither new
3 nor unique to the health 
sector as such – the so-called medical “brain drain” causes the unique problem of 
severe  workforce  shortages  in  developing  country  health  systems  that  are  already 
under  stress.
4  Exceptions  are  countries  like  India  and  the  Philippines,  which  have 
collaborative  health-worker  migration  schemes  and  are  reported  to  over-produce 
physicians and nurses intended for an international market.
5 A notable difference with 
the  past  is  that  migration  and  the  accompanying  shortage  of  health  personnel  for 
developing countries is now usually permanent.
6 Faced with a dwindling work force, 
the  task  facing  developing  countries  in  building  up  their  health  care  systems  is 
particularly daunting. This is the more so for Sub-Saharan African countries which 
suffer the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which uses up most of health and medical services 
and claims the lives of many health workers.
7  
This paper provides an overview of the evidence and applied literature on medical 
migration.  Since  migration  of  health  workers  influences  the  provision  of  health 
services, or put differently since an expansion of health provision in the short-run is 
often only possible via the importation of health workers, and impacts upon the well-
being  of  the  population,  the  paper  includes  a  survey  of  applied  macroeconomic 
models  on  changes  in  health  and/or  health  care  provision.  The  paper  is  part  of  a 
                                                 
2   Ahmad  (2005),    Alkire  and  Chen  (2004),  Awases  et  al.  (2004),  Bach  (2003),  Buchan  and  Dovlo  (2004),  Buchan  and 
Perfilieva (2006), Dovlo and Martineau (2004), Eastwood et al. (2005), GCIM (2005), Hagopian et al. (2004), Forcier et al. 
(2004), Padarath et al. (2004), Pang et al. (2002), Stilwell et al. (2004), Vujicic et al. (2004), WHO (2006).  
3   See Bundred and Levitt (2000), Martineau et al. (2002) and Bach (2004) for a historical perspective. 
4   Stilwell et al. (2004).  
5   Hagopian et al. (2004), Buchan et al. (2003), Forcier et al. (2004). 
6   In countries with better opportunities, such as India, some health workers do return (Eastwood et al. 2005). 
7   Dixon et al. (2002) for example report a HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 20% for South African nurses.   3 
broader research project examining the economic effects of the medical brain drain on 
both receiving countries and sending countries.
8  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  empirical 
literature applied to the economic effects of health and health care provision, focusing 
on  Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  models.  We  find  that  the  economic 
impacts of endogenous changes in health provision on the health of the population, 
well-being  and  effective  labour  supplies  are  relatively  little  researched.  Section  3 
zooms in on the applied international migration literature. Global welfare gains are a 
well-established result of this literature, with developing countries gaining especially 
from  (temporary)  out-migration  of  unskilled  labour  in  which  they  are  relatively 
abundant. The impact of liberalising the movement of skilled workers on global (and 
developing country) welfare is a lot less clear due to the more likely to be permanent 
loss  of  scarce  human  capital,  i.e.  the  brain  drain  from  developing  to  developed 
countries. On top of that the medical brain drain is likely to have associated adverse 
(positive)  health  and  welfare  consequences  for  developing  source  (developed 
destination)  countries,  an  aspect  which  has  not  been  explicitly  quantified  so  far. 
Section 4 presents an overview of the evidence on migration flows and associated 
remittance behaviour of medical personnel from developing to developed countries, 
underlying causes and associated health and welfare impacts. The evidence suggests 
that,  while  medical  migration  flows  are  multi-directional  both  within  and  across 
countries,  particularly  English-speaking  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the 
Caribbean with a relatively small base of health workers and high burden of disease 
are likely to lose from  the medical brain drain to the benefit of English-speaking 
countries  in  the  North,  most  notably  the  UK  and  the  USA.  Section  5  documents 
current policies on international (medical) migration and their influence on observed 
and expected future migration flows, and discusses the agenda for the future. The 
suggested  way  forward  is  concerted  action  by  all  relevant  stakeholders,  which  is 
country-led and accords to a commonly agreed international framework to manage 
medical migration flows so that brain drains are turned into gains. The final section 
concludes. 
                                                 
8   A first paper tackles the receiving countries’ perspective, taking the UK as an archetype OECD economy which imports 
medical services, whereas a second paper tackles the sending countries’ perspective.   4 
2. Macro-economic models of changes in health (provision) 
The interactions between health care, health and the remainder of the economy are 
multiple  and  complex.  On  the  one  hand,  changes  in  income  impact  upon  the 
consumption and/or provision of health care and other goods, which affects the health 
of  populations  in  terms  of  mortality  and  morbidity  (illness).  On  the  other  hand, 
changes  in  health  impact  upon  the  well-being  of  populations,  with  associated 
consequences  for  labour  market  participation,  productivity  and  income.  While  the 
interdependencies between health care, health and the rest of the economy are now 
widely acknowledged, economic models which are used to assess these generally do 
not incorporate the main channels through which interactions take place.  
The majority of empirical studies employ econometric analysis and usually conceal or 
ignore the general equilibrium effects of changes in health and health care  across 
sectors, factors, households and their implications for the government budget.
9 The 
applied literature focusing on general equilibrium effects of changes in health and 
health care on the economy is small but diverse in terms of application area, the 
majority having a developing country context.
10 The majority of CGE studies that 
exist can be arranged into three groups to show the diversity in research themes; they 
are, in chronological order, models of health or health care as a basic need (Basic 
Needs models), CGE analyses of health care as having an external effect (Externality 
models) and studies of epidemics (HIV/AIDS models). Each strand will be shortly 
discussed below. 
A related strand of Health Sector models
11 claims to be of the general equilibrium 
type, but since the model domain spans health care markets only and abstracts from 
the “rest of the world” they are truly partial in nature.
 These models are typically 
applied  to  developed  countries  and  feature  the  behaviour  of  patients,  general 
                                                 
9   Econometric  models  focusing  on  multiple  linkages  between  health,  health  expenditures  and  economic  growth  include 
Bhargava  et  al.  (2001),  Bloom  and  Canning  (2000),  Bloom,  Canning  and  Jamison  (2004),  Bloom  et  al.  (2001,  2004), 
Crémieux et al. (1999), Ettner (1996), Hamoudi and Sachs (1999), Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Jamison et al. (2003), Knowles 
and Owen (1997), Mayer (2001a,b), Pritchett and Summers (1996), Strauss and Thomas (1998), Stronks et al. (1997) and 
Thomas (2001). 
10   The exceptions are Lee and McKibbin’s (2003) study of the global economic effects of SARS based on the G-Cubed (Asia 
Pacific) model and Smith et al.’s (2005) static UK model of the macroeconomic impact of antimicrobial resistance. 
11   Chatterji and Paelinck (1991) develop a purely theoretical general equilibrium model. Canton and Westerhout (1999a, b) and 
Folmer et al. (1997) construct a model applied to the Dutch pharmaceutical and health care market respectively, which are 
employed to analyse financial reform measures.  
   5 
practitioners,  medical  specialists,  pharmacists,  drug  producers  (brand  name  and 
generic),  parallel  importers,  insurance  companies  and  hospitals  and  the  various 
interrelationships  between  them.  Special  attention  is  devoted  to  the  presence  of 
market  failures  such  as  information  asymmetries  between  patients,  physicians  and 
pharmacists (principal-agency problems) and imperfect competition in the market for 
pharmaceuticals  caused  by  patenting.  Although  the  detailed  level  of  analysis  of 
medical  care  represents  a  constructive  addition  to  the  CGE  literature  applied  to 
changes in health and health care, their partial character precludes general equilibrium 
analyses such as resource claims of health care (i.e. competition for scarce factors of 
production  such  as  capital  and  labour),  government  budget  implications  and  the 
impact  on  effective  labour  supply  of  improved  health,  which  are  crucial  for  our 
understanding of the economic impact of health provision. 
Basic Needs models 
The earliest type of models that acknowledge the economy-wide effects of improved 
health, Basic Needs models,
12 were designed to implement the basic needs approach 
to development of the 1970s into a comprehensive framework, with its overarching 
goal of basic needs satisfaction. Improved health features in terms of demographic 
variables, working time and labour productivity effects. However, health and health 
policy fulfil only a minor role and it is virtually impossible to disentangle the effect of 
improved health within counterfactual simulations. Furthermore, Basic Needs models 
typically are recursive dynamic, applied to developing countries and by virtue of the 
latter, suffer from lack of data, a rather ad hoc approach to modelling of economic 
behaviour  (not  based  on  micro-economic  optimisation  behaviour)  and  abstraction 
from  several  general  equilibrium  elements  (such  as  endogenous  prices  and  a 
government budget).  
Externality models 
Externality  models  account  for  the  presence  of  external  effects,  such  as  health, 
education and environmental effects, in a CGE framework. To our knowledge only 
                                                 
12   Vianen and Waardenburg (1975) focus entirely on health care (in Tanzania) and model the working time effect of improved 
health by postulating that the number of people recovering or dying is a function of the number of treatments, next to those 
who  recover  spontaneously.  In  van  der  Hoeven’s  (1987,  1988)  Kenyan  model  health  is  restricted  primarily  to  affect 
demographic  variables.  Kouwenaar’s  (1987)  model  for  Ecuador  also  includes  a  labour  productivity  effect  via  labour 
augmenting technological progress.   6 
one CGE model of health externalities exists, that by Savard and Adjovi (1997).
13 
Health  improvements  appear  endogenously  in  the  form  of  improved  labour 
productivity  by  implementing  labour-augmenting  technological  progress  in 
production (as a function of government expenditures on health relative to the base 
year) which influences the optimal combination of inputs in production and relative 
wages.  
The  main  aim  of  the  model,  and  indeed  of  most  externality  models,  is  to  verify 
whether  the  standard  CGE  result  of  (small)  economic  benefits  from  trade 
liberalisation holds in the presence of positive health and education externalities. The 
conclusion is negative as cuts in government expenditure on health and education, 
aimed  at  maintaining  the  government  deficit,  have  negative  spill-over  effects  on 
domestic product and public sector employment, household income and welfare.  
In contrast to Basic Needs models, this model is firmly grounded in microeconomic 
optimisation behaviour and accounts for various inter-sectoral linkages. However, it 
too  is  applied  to  developing  country  issues  in  which  health  is  only  of  secondary 
importance.  Further  caveats  are  a  lack  of  dynamic  effects,  no  distinction  between 
working and non-working or age groups, and absence of endogenous labour supply 
effects  (i.e.  the  impact  of  better  health  on  working  time)  and  utility  gains  from 
improved health.  
HIV/AIDS models 
The most recent class of models of HIV/AIDS
14 assess the economic impact of HIV 
(Human  Immunodeficiency  Virus)  and  AIDS  (Acquired  Immune  Deficiency 
Syndrome) using (recursive) dynamic CGE analysis. Generally, with the exception of 
Dixon et al. (2004), this literature models the negative health consequences of the 
pandemic  by  imposing  exogenous  demographic  and  behavioural  scenario’s  on  the 
                                                 
13    A selection of environmental CGE models featuring side effects on health care is: Vennemo (1997), Beghin et al. (1999), 
Bruvoll et al. (1999), Garbaccio et al. (2000) and Li (2002). 
14   Kambou, Devarajan and Over (1992) implement the impact of HIV/AIDS on the Cameroonian economy by reducing growth 
rates  for  labour  supply  by  skill  type.  Arndt  and  Lewis’s  (2000,  2001)  South  African  model  incorporates  a  variety  of 
demographic and behavioural effects (household and government responses to palliate the negative consequences of the 
pandemic). The impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the rate of skill accumulation via  reductions in education spending is 
assessed by Arndt and Wobst’s (2002) Tanzanian model and Arndt’s (2003) model for Mozambique. Finally, Dixon et al. 
(2004) models the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and health interventions on the Botswana economy. Whereas the 
pandemic  and  the  mitigating  effects  of  two  health  policies  are  endogenously  modelled,  other  health  expenditures  are 
assumed not to affect the health of the population, the labour force and (this is true for all policies) population well-being.   7 
economy.
15 Typical features of the pandemic are that it reduces labour supply by skill 
type, factor productivity, and increases household and government expenditures on 
health  care  at  a  cost  of  expenditures  on  other  goods  and  savings.  Under  these 
assumptions the literature’s main finding is that the slow-down in physical capital 
accumulation (due to lower savings and investments), productivity growth, population 
growth  and  human  capital  accumulation  (due  to  a  fall  in  supply  and  demand  for 
education) reduces economic growth and results in a fall in per capita income in the 
long term compared to a fictional “No-AIDS” scenario.  
HIV/AIDS models share with the foregoing strands of literature the application to 
developing  countries  and  associated  data  problems.  Relative  to  Basic  Needs  and 
Externality models, HIV/AIDS models are however more sophisticated in the sense 
that they model the various channels through which changes in health, albeit negative, 
affect the economy in greatest detail. Most likely due to the incurable nature of the 
disease, the HIV/AIDS studies abstract from any positive feedback effect from health 
(and other) expenditures to population health, well-being and labour supply. 
From the foregoing analysis we can conclude that, while each of these strands of 
literature has its own merits, the existing models do not comprehensively assess the 
endogenous  impact  of  changes  in  health  care  provision  on  the  health  of  the 
population, the labour force and its impact on production, income and welfare (i.e. 
well-being or utility) over time in a (developed country) CGE setting.
 This caveat is 
addressed in the remaining two papers of this research project, in which we model the 
economic impacts of medical migration in a (albeit static) CGE context both from a 
sending and a receiving country’s perspective, whilst recognising the simultaneous 
effects  of  consequent  changes  in  health  on  effective  labour  supplies,  population 
welfare and the resource claims made by the health care sector.  
                                                 
15  This is also the  method used by Smith  et  al.’s (2005) static UK  model of the  macroeconomic impact of  antimicrobial 
resistance, where antimicrobial resistance impacts upon labour supply, inputs productivity and health care delivery costs. 
Hence, while modelling a different health problem, this model bears the same characteristics as HIV/AIDS models and 
suffers from the same caveats.   8 
3. Macro-economic models of international labour migration 
Economic  literature  unequivocally  finds  considerable  global  welfare  gains  from 
removing barriers to international migration. These gains arise as workers flow from 
low productivity areas (developing countries) to high productivity areas (developed 
countries) yielding a rise in world output.
16 Given the lack of applied models which 
focus specifically on the movement of medical personnel, this section reviews the 
applied economic models that have been developed to study the effects of increased 
worldwide labour migration, with an emphasis on Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) models. 
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) 
The first (partial equilibrium) study by Hamilton and Whalley (1984) estimates that, 
by removing restrictions on international labour mobility, annual world income could 
easily rise by 100% or more, most of the gains being realised in the initial phases of 
migration.  The  latter  suggests  that  even  a  small  liberalisation  of  the  international 
labour market brings about substantial welfare gains. The authors find that, while not 
all  gains  accrue  to  developing  countries,  the  size  of  the  gains  indicates  that 
liberalisation of migration may be the most important issue from which developing 
countries stand to gain.  
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) point out several shortcomings with respect to the costs 
and  benefits  for  source  and  destination  countries  that  could  be  improved.  Firstly, 
neither the loss of human capital due to out-migration (i.e. the cost of education), nor 
gains in human capital (for example upon return, or those generated by a rise in the 
expected  return  on  education  for  those  staying  behind)  are  modelled.
17  Secondly, 
compensating financial flows, i.e. remittances, are not modelled. Finally, Hamilton 
and  Whalley  do  not  incorporate  selective  (i.e.  skilled)  migration,  as  opposed  to 
general (skilled and unskilled) migration, which could drive down wages of unskilled 
and worsen worldwide income distribution. 
                                                 
16   Bhatnagar (2004). Note that this presumes a definition of productivity directly related to pay, thereby ignoring the impact 
upon the health and well-being of the population. 
17  Schiff (2005) shows that claims about the size and impact of the brain gain stemming from the increased expected return on 
education in the country of origin on welfare and growth are greatly exaggerated and that brain drain is likely to just entail a 
loss for developing source countries. See also the World Bank (2005b, p. 208-210).   9 
Moses and Letnes (2003, 2004) 
In an attempt to update the analysis of Hamilton and Whalley, Moses and Letnes 
(2003)  provide  estimates  of  the  actual  number  of  migrants  and  per-migrant 
cost/benefits  associated  with  various  levels  of  migration  and  compare  these  with 
contemporary migration flows and associated economic gains.  
For the migration scenarios the authors rely on an updated model and data for three 
world regions, documented in Moses and Letnes (2004), with which they estimate the 
worldwide  welfare  gains  of  a  full  relaxation  of  migration  controls  to  be  US$3.4 
trillion, 9.6% of real world GDP in 1998, much higher than the US$0.58 trillion they 
predict for 1977.
18 These are, as in Hamilton and Whalley (1984), generated mostly in 
the initial phases of migration.  
The migration flows associated with the various migration scenarios are found to be 
very large; in the conservative scenario of a 1% relaxation of migration controls, the 
model generates 44 million migrants (5% of the population in the developed world). 
The same is true for per-migrant gains (estimates are almost nine times larger than 
those from other studies), with total welfare gains of US$84 billion by large out-
competing the gains of alternative development strategies. These accrue primarily to 
the developed region (per-migrant gain of $3600), whereas the developing regions 
lose  out  (per-migrant  losses  of  $1000  for  middle-income  and  $2700  for  poorest 
countries).
19  
Whilst  having  updated  the  study  by  Hamilton  and  Whalley  (1984),  Moses  and 
Letnes’s (2003, 2004) analysis still suffers from the same shortcomings mentioned 
previously. Notably the absence of remittances might, as mentioned by the authors, 
explain why the developing regions are worse off with increased international labour 
mobility.  
                                                 
18   Moses and Letnes (2004) give lowest and highest estimates of US$1.97 trillion and US$ 55.04 trillion respectively. 
19   In  an  attempt  to  produce  more  realistic  model  outcomes,  the  authors  subsequently  increase  the  efficiency  difference 
separating rich and poor countries to rather unrealistic levels (unrealistic in the sense that at some point migration flows 
reverse). This adjustment results in a migration flow in the 1% scenario of 12 million people (1.3% of the developed world 
population), generating a lower but still significant overall welfare gain of $5 billion. However, since these outcomes are 
based on unrealistic migration assumptions, Moses and Letnes argue that the original model is probably producing better 
estimates of the potential gains of international labour migration.   10 
Iregui (2003) 
Iregui (2003) is one of the first to distinguish between different types of labour, the 
skilled and the unskilled. Using a multi-regional CGE model, she finds that a removal 
of  the  restrictions  on  labour  generates  considerable  global  welfare  gains,  of  in 
between 15% to 67% of world GDP.  These gains are reduced in the presence of a 
segmented labour market to a level of 13% to 59% of world GDP, since there are less 
opportunities for skilled and unskilled labour to reallocate, and fall to a level of 3% to 
11% of world GDP if only skilled labour is allowed to migrate, explained by the fact 
that the skilled form only a small proportion of the developing world’s work force. In 
the latter case, a relatively large number of skilled workers migrate (59%-73% of 
skilled labour endowments of developing regions, compared to 35%-50% for skilled 
and unskilled labour migration) so that migration costs (calculated as the transport 
costs of migrating people) outweigh welfare gains, producing an overall welfare loss.  
In line with the previous studies, Iregui (2003) shows that when skilled and unskilled 
workers migrate, wages in the regions of origin (destination) rise (fall) and capital 
rents  fall  (rise)  since  labour  (capital)  has  become  relatively  scarce.  Skilled  labour 
benefits relatively more compared to unskilled labour since they are relatively scarce 
in the developing regions, and more so after migration. When only the skilled migrate, 
skilled workers in the regions of origin gain, whereas unskilled workers and capital 
owners  are  worse  off  in  spite  of  increases  in  their  remuneration.  In  destination 
regions, skilled wages fall, whereas unskilled wages and capital rents rise.  
The author adjusts her analysis for three factors that are likely to affect the results: 
transaction costs, international capital mobility and selective labour mobility between 
particular developing and developed regions. The introduction of transaction costs 
associated with migration is shown to reduce welfare gains and migration costs fall 
due to reduced migration flows. Adjusting the model for capital mobility (where the 
unskilled remains fixed) improves aggregate welfare gains, though the effect on the 
remuneration  of  capital  is  smaller  due  to  relatively  small  size  of  capital  flows 
compared to migration flows (7% of world capital endowments, as opposed to 56% of 
world  labour  endowments).  With  selective  labour  mobility  the  aggregate  welfare 
improvement depends on the size of the region of origin’s labour endowment. An   11 
obvious factor missing from this analysis is the impact of remittances which will flow 
back from regions of destination to regions of origin. 
Walmsley and Winters (2003), Winters (2003b), Winters et al. (2003) 
In a series of papers, Winters and others analyse the economic impact of liberalising 
GATS  Mode  4,  i.e.  the  temporary  movement  of  natural  persons  (TMNP)  from 
developing  to  developed  countries.  Using  a  static  version  of  the  Global  Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model, the authors find that increasing the inward mobility 
of skilled and unskilled labour by only 3% of the developed countries’ work forces, 
just  a  fraction  of the  flow  possible  from  a  WTO  arrangement  on  Mode  4,  yields 
welfare gains of $156 billion a year (approximately 0.6% of world income in 1997), 
shared over all countries. Most of these gains stem from increased unskilled rather 
than skilled labour mobility, stemming from the relative abundance of the unskilled in 
developing countries and the relatively large size of the productivity gap between host 
and home countries for this type of workers.  
Whilst TMNP has the benefit of avoiding political costs associated with permanent 
migration (i.e. threat to culture or integration and benefit claims), the authors also 
expect gains from migration to increase in time due to the ageing and skill-upgrading 
of populations in developed countries.
20 The only challenge posed by TMNP is to 
ensure that local unskilled workers in developed countries are not worse off by the 
inflow of migrant workers, which could be done via some form of compensation in 
the short run and education/training and attention to asset distribution in the long run.  
The  distributional  analysis  of  this  study  is  the  most  sophisticated  of  all  studies 
discussed so far; it accounts for remittance flows and distinguishes between home and 
host country residents, defined as the set of people in a country respectively before 
and after migration occurs, and temporary migrants/workers. The results indicate that 
the original residents of developing source countries benefit most due to temporary 
migrants earning a higher wage abroad. While migrants send remittances back home, 
the permanent residents of developing countries lose out due to a fall in remunerations 
                                                 
20   As Hollingsworth et al. (2005) rightfully points out, this is only true if one is willing to assume that absorption of TMNP is 
frictionless, i.e. there is full employment and wages fall so as to preserve the equilibrium in the labour market following 
migration.   12 
to other factors, including capital. The original residents of developed countries are 
also better of due to higher capital rents and tax revenues.  
Global Economic Prospects 2006 
The Global Economic Prospects 2006 (GEP) focuses on the economic implications of 
remittances and migration from developing to high-income countries and is the latest 
study presenting estimates of the size of the welfare gains of migration.
21 The GEP’s 
main finding is that migration of 3% of the labour force of high-income countries over 
the period 1970-2000 yields a global welfare gain of $356 billion (an 0.6% increase in 
global income). This welfare gain exceeds that of global trade reform and primarily 
accrues to the poorest developing regions, though developed countries gain as well.
22 
Compared to the previous studies, the analysis is novel in mainly two respects. Firstly, 
it  takes  into  account  differences  in  purchasing  power  between  high-income  and 
developing  countries,  which  deflates  the  welfare  gains  for  migrants.  Secondly,  it 
distinguishes between natives in high-income and developing countries, new migrants 
and old migrants in high-income countries. The latter two are considered to be closer 
substitutes compared to new migrants and natives so that earlier migrants experience a 
fall in wages and a fall in income of 6% following migration. Natives in high-income 
countries experience income gains of 0.4% since the return to capital increases which 
offsets the marginal decline in wages. In contrast to Walmsley and Winters’ work, 
natives in developing countries gain as well (by 0.9%), which is primarily explained 
from the remittances from new migrants and increased wages of remaining labourers. 
The main beneficiaries, however, are new migrants who see their incomes rise by 
200%. 
In  conclusion,  economic  models  suggest  that  the  migration  of  workers  leads  to 
considerable global welfare gains. A relatively large part of the welfare gains accrue 
to  developing  countries  and  can  be  attributed  primarily  to  (temporary)  increased 
unskilled  labour  migration.  The  impact  of  liberalising  the  movement  of  skilled 
workers on global welfare, and more specifically developing country welfare, is a lot 
                                                 
21   World Bank (2005c). The study uses the (dynamic) LINKAGE model, which is based on GTAP release version 6.0. 
22   The findings of GEP are comparable to that of Walmsley and Winters when adjusting the assumed productivity catch up of 
new migrants from 50% of the wage differential between developing and high-income countries to 75% as used in GEP. 
This assumption seems more realistic since much of the observed migration is permanent rather than temporary.    13 
less clear due to the effect of the (more likely to be permanent) loss of scarce human 
capital  to  source  countries,  i.e.  the  brain  drain.  The  remaining  two  papers  of  this 
research  project  attempt  to  address  this  caveat,  by  modelling  in  greater  detail  the 
migration of skilled health workers, i.e. the “medical brain drain” from developing 
countries to developed countries.  
The  focus  on  medical  migration  also  allows  us  to  address  another  caveat  of  the 
existing literature on migration, which is to analyse the associated adverse health (and 
welfare)  consequences  for  many  developing  countries,  particularly  in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, that already suffer from severe medical workforce shortages and, their mirror 
image,  the  associated  positive  health  (and  welfare)  consequences  for  developed 
countries, such as the UK, whose health care systems are rationed by limited public 
funding. Accounting for population health effects associated with the international 
movement  of  health  workers  may  well  lower  global  welfare  gains  and  increase 
inequalities across regions. This is because the health and welfare gains of an influx of 
health workers into developed countries with relatively well-functioning health care 
systems are likely to be insufficient to compensate for the adverse health and welfare 
consequences of the loss of scarce health workers for developing countries where 
(well-) functioning health care systems are usually lacking and where the burden of 
disease is high.  
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4. Patterns of international migration of health workers 
This section describes the international flows of medical personnel, their causes and 
consequences for sending and receiving countries. Although there is a vast amount of 
empirical literature on medical migration (vide the extensive list of references), the 
available data on international medical migration flows is rather weak and patchy.
23 
We  thus  focus  on  the  two  types  of  medical  personnel  for  which  international 
migration statistics are more reliable and more readily available and which are pivotal 
to the delivery of key health services in developing countries, doctors (physicians) and 
nurses. We further restrict ourselves to survey studies, where needed supplemented 
with anecdotal evidence, so as to extract the general patterns of international medical 
migration. 
General patterns: carousels and conveyer belts 
Exports  of  medical  personnel  are  mostly  from  Southern  hemisphere  countries  in 
Africa, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and South Asia, whereas imports are mostly 
from Northern countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Belgium, the UK and 
the USA.
24 The former can be subdivided into surplus countries which voluntarily 
send health workers abroad, including Cuba, India, Egypt and the Philippines, and 
shortage countries where out-migration of health personnel is involuntarily, mostly in 
Africa, the Caribbean and Asia.
25 The latter are generally shortage countries, though 
some  argue  that  there  are  also  problems  with  incentives,  productivity,  skill-mix, 
geographical imbalances and supplier-induced demand.
26  
Migration flows between these Southern and Northern countries are multi-directional. 
Medical  migration  can  be  described  as  a  “carousel”,  in  which  doctors  and  nurses 
migrate  from  one  country  to  another  that  offers  better  working  and/or  living 
conditions.
27 In the past for example, doctors from Tanzania, Kenya or Nigeria would 
                                                 
23   Diallo (2004) elaborates on sources, uses and challenges for migration data. 
24   Alkire and Chen (2004), Bach  (2003, 2006).  
25   Alkire and Chen (2004), Dovlo (2004), Buchan et al. (2003), Forcier et al. (2004), Hagopian et al. (2004), Schrecker and 
Labonte (2004). Some of these countries do report internal shortages of physicians (India) and nurses (Philippines), notably 
in rural areas. See for example Nullis-Kapp (2005). 
26   Bloor et al. (2006). 
27   Alkire and Chen (2004), Bundred and Levitt (2000), Eastwood et al. (2005), Martineau et al. (2002), Joint Learning Initiative 
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move to South Africa
28, South African doctors would move to the UK, British doctors 
to Canada and the USA and Canadian doctors to the USA. The obvious losers are the 
poorest Sub-Saharan African nations at the start of the carousel who experience a net 
brain drain since the carousel does not, as in the past, turn a full circle anymore.
29 
Figure 1 illustrates the carousel for a selection of countries.
30 It shows that there’s a 
considerable amount of “cycling” between English-speaking developed nations.
31 
Figure 1: A carousel of health workers - external migration 
      Source: Alkire and Chen (2004), Figure 9 
Other studies use the term “conveyer belt” to describe medical migration flows. This 
term  captures  the  internal  medical  migration  flows  that  are  prompted  by  external 
medical migration flows and vice versa.
32 For example, a vacancy left behind by an 
emigrant health worker in a large city forms a good career opportunity for a health 
                                                 
28   This is not the case anymore as, since 1995, South Africa has stopped recruiting doctors from other Organisation of African 
Unity countries (Bundred and Levitt, 2000). 
29   Eastwood et al. (2005). 
30   Note that some health workers in the north also temporarily move south to gain work experience, but these amounts are 
relatively small.  
31   Mullan (2005). 
32   Padarath et al. (2004), Schrecker and Labonte (2004).   16 
worker in a rural area, where working and living conditions are worse.
33 Also, internal 
mal-distribution of health workers attracts health workers from surplus countries, as is 
illustrated  by  Cuban  doctors  filling  in  vacancies  in  Southern  Africa.
34  Within 
countries health workers tend to move from the public to the private sector and from 
rural to urban areas with better working and/or living conditions.
35 Figure 2 illustrates.  
Figure 2: The conveyer belt of health workers - internal-external migration linkages 
       
                   Source: adapted from Schrecker and Labonte (2004), Figure 1 
International migration flows of doctors 
The  most  recent  comprehensive  study  on  the  international  physician  migration  is 
Mullan  (2005).  He  investigates  the  international  composition  of  physicians  in  the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada  and  Australia  and  computes  an 
emigration  factor  for  the  source  countries  of  the  immigrant  physicians,  which 
represents  a  relative  measure  of  the  physician  brain  drain.  Mullan  finds  that  in 
between 23 and 28 percent of physicians in these countries are international medical 
graduates, with in between 40 and 75 percent of these coming from lower-income 
countries  (using  the  World  Bank  classification  of  countries).  The  major  source 
                                                 
33   Eastwood et al. (2005). 
34   Bach (2003, 2006), Chikanda (2004), Padarath et al. (2004), Skeldon (2005), Schrecker and Labonte (2004). 
35   Awases et al. (2004), Dovlo and Martineau (2004).   17 
countries  are  India  (59,523  physicians),  the  Philippines  (18,303)  and  Pakistan 
(12,813). However, using the physician emigration factor, the drain is relatively high 
for countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. The UK, Canada and Australia 
draw substantially from South Africa, whereas the USA draws relatively heavily from 
the Philippines. Table 1, 2 and 3 display the main results.  
The  four  recipient  countries  account  for  the  bulk  of  migrants  from  lower-income 
countries, so that the patterns discerned by Mullan (2005) are indicative of the extent 
of the brain drain of physicians. Nevertheless, the study does not tell the whole story. 
Firstly, it excludes recipient countries other than the USA, UK, Canada and Australia. 
This includes countries with fewer than 1000 physicians for which the extent of the 
brain drain is likely to be relatively high. Furthermore, the study cannot discern trends 
over time, since it uses World Health Organization (WHO) data from the most recent 
year.  Finally,  it  conceals  the  fact  that  many  foreign-trained  physicians  migrate  to 
attend  post-graduate  training.
36  Mullan  (2005)  does  include  some  data  for  other 
OECD countries to draw comparisons: only three other OECD countries report shares 
of  international  medical  graduates  in  the  physician  work  force  of  more  than  10 
percent. These countries are New Zealand (34.5%), Switzerland (17.8%) and Norway 
(12.7%). For France and Japan these figures are 3% and 1% respectively. Germany is 
the major source country of physicians for Switzerland and Norway, providing 60% 
and 33% of physician supply respectively, whereas New Zealand’s physician source 
countries are similar to that of Australia (being the UK, India and South Africa). 
Mullan’s (2005) findings are in line with an earlier survey study of Hagopian et al. 
(2004) on the migration of physicians trained in Sub-Saharan Africa into the world’s 
largest “consumer” of health workers, the USA. This study finds that more than 23% 
of physicians in the USA received their medical training abroad, mostly (64%) in low-
income or lower-middle-income countries. A total of 5,334 of these come from Sub-
Saharan Africa, representing more than 6% of the stock of physicians in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Furthermore,  most  of  these  Africans  come  from  three  countries,  Nigeria, 
South Africa and Ghana, and 79% of these are trained at only 10 medical schools.  
                                                 
36   Simoens and Hurst (2006).   18 
Table 1: International Medical Graduates (IMGs) in the USA, UK, Canada & Australia 
   Source: Mullan (2005), Table 1 
Table 2: Top 5 source countries of IMGs in the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
    Source: adapted from Mullan (2005), Table 2 
Table 3: Emigration factors by region 
       Source: Mullan (2005), Table 4   19 
International migration flows of nurses 
Due to the nursing shortages in many developed countries, there appears to be an 
upward trend in inflow of nurses from developing countries. There are several survey 
papers on the international migration of nurses, including Buchan et al. (2003, 2005), 
Buchan and Sochalski (2004) which corroborate this observation. The papers make 
use of the same study, supported by the WHO, the International Council of Nurses, 
and the Royal College of Nursing (UK), which compiled registration data from five 
destination countries, Australia, Ireland, Norway, the UK and the USA. The main 
results are described below. 
The authors find a noteworthy increase in the flow of nurses into these destination 
countries,  both  in  terms  of  absolute  numbers  and  in  proportion  to  new  nurses 
becoming eligible to practice. Especially Ireland and the UK experienced a steep rise 
in  the  inflow  of  international  nurses.  The  principle  source  countries  of  nurses  for 
Ireland  were  Australia,  India,  The  Philippines,  South  Africa  and  the  UK.  The 
principle  source  countries  for  the  UK  were  (in  decreasing  order  using  the  latest 
available data
37) India, Philippines, Australia, and South Africa. Since the second half 
of the nineties, the ratio of foreign-trained to newly licensed nurses in the USA is also 
on the rise. The main source countries for the USA were (in decreasing order) the 
Philippines, Canada and Africa (mainly Nigeria and South Africa).  
The extent to which different destination countries rely on recruiting from developing 
or developed source countries varies significantly. Figure 3 shows that the UK, the 
USA and to a lesser extent Ireland are relying  significantly on the recruitment of 
international nurses from countries that are lower-middle income and low income. In 
contrast Australia (Victoria) and Norway are relying mainly on nurse supply from 
other high-income or high-middle income countries (respectively the UK and New 
Zealand; other Scandinavian countries and Germany).  
A comprehensive survey of nurse migration from the perspective of source countries 
in order to be able to measure the extent of the nurse brain drain to date does not exist. 
Buchan et al. (2003, 2005) does report data for a selection of source countries, but 
                                                 
37   See UK paper.   20 
these are difficult to compare due to differences in definition, reliability and reference 
period. The data do seem to suggest that especially English speaking Sub-Saharan 
African countries and countries from the Caribbean experience significant losses of 
the already few domestically trained nurses. This is corroborated by data on nurses 
and midwives working in seven OECD recipient countries reported by the WHO in 
the World Health Report 2006 (Table 4, next page).
38  
How  do  migration  flows  for  doctors  and  nurses  compare?  Anecdotal  evidence  
suggests that in absolute numbers the loss of nurses is more severe compared to the 
loss of physicians due to the sheer volume of nurse migration (e.g. more than 150,000 
Filipino nurses and 18,000 Zimbabwean nurses work abroad).
39 But compared to an 
average of 23% of physicians trained in Sub-Saharan Africa working in the selection 
of OECD countries
40 - of which 14% in the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia (see 
Table 3) - the average of 5% reported for nurses and midwives (Table 4) is relatively 
small. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, figures vary widely from country to country, so 
that the extent of the brain drain (and gain for developed destination countries) should 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis relative to the stock of health workers.   
Figure 3: Composition of inflow of nurses into the UK, Norway, Ireland, Australia 
(Victoria State) and the USA by type of source country (World Bank classification) 
  Source: Buchan et al. (2005), Figure 4 
                                                 
38   WHO (2006). 
39   Pang et al. (2002). 
40   From WHO (2006), Table 5.2.   21 
Table 4: Nurses and midwives trained in Sub-Saharan Africa working in the OECD 
             Source: World Health Report 2006, Table 5.3 
 
Causes 
The underlying causes for medical migration are well documented in the literature 
(see  Table  5).
41  Incentives  to  migrate  typically  involve  a  combination  of  “push 
factors” (unsatisfactory working or living conditions in the country of origin) and 
“pull factors” (attractive working or living conditions, availability of positions and 
active  recruitment  in  the  country  of  destination).  In  general,  pull  factors  tend  to 
dominate  as  migration  is  only  beneficial  if  there  are  vacancies  in  the  destination 
country.
42 Regarding the relative importance of financial versus non-financial factors, 
research by Vujicic et al. (2004) finds little correlation between the supply of medical 
migrants  and  the  size  of  the  wage  differential.
43  This  finding  suggests  that  non-
financial factors play a crucial role in the decision to migrate.   
                                                 
41   Ahmad  (2005),    Alkire  and  Chen  (2004),  Awases  et  al.  (2004),  Bach  (2003),  Buchan  and  Dovlo  (2004),  Buchan  and 
Perfilieva (2006), Dovlo and Martineau (2004), Eastwood et al. (2005), Hagopian et al. (2004), Forcier et al. (2004), Pang et 
al. (2002), Stilwell et al. (2004), Vujicic et al. (2004), WHO (2006). The Global Commission on International Migration 
(GCIM, 2005) groups them under the “3Ds”; differences in development, demography and democracy. Padarath et al. (2004) 
also distinguishes stick and stay factors mitigating the push out of source and destination countries. 
42   Stilwell et al. (2004), Bach (2004). Other authors, including Dovlo and Martineau (2004) claim that the opposite is true and 
the push out of source countries is the dominating factor. 
43   This counterintuitive result is explained from the relatively large size of the wage differential between source and destination 
countries, so that small wage increases in source countries have little impact on migration flows.   22 
Table 5: Causes of medical migration 
Push Factors 
Lack of opportunities for postgraduate training 
Underfunding of health service and research facilities: lack of basic medical supplies and equipment, 
contributing to an insecure work environment 
Absence of established posts and career opportunities 
Poor remuneration and conditions of service, including retirement provision 
Governance and health-service management shortcomings (inefficient and unfair) 
Civil unrest and personal security: human rights violations, ethnic, religious and political tensions, 
wars, economic collapse 
Pull Factors 
Opportunities for further training and career advancement 
The presence of centres of medical and educational excellence 
Greater  financial  and  non-financial  rewards,  improved  working  conditions  (safer  and  more 
satisfying), opportunities for remittances 
Availability of posts, often combined with active recruitment by prospective employing countries 
Political and economic stability, aid work, travel opportunities 
Source: adapted from Eastwood et al. (2005) 
A factor operating in the background of Table 5 is that the similarity of language 
between source and destination countries largely determines the observed pairings of 
source and destination countries.
44 This, for example, explains the cyclical pattern of 
medical migration between Australia, Canada, Ireland, the UK and the USA; between 
Austria,  Germany  and  Switzerland;  between  Belgium  and  France;  and  between 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. For some of these countries, geographical 
proximity clearly plays an important role.  
For  developing  source  countries,  similarity  of  language  with  popular  destination 
countries  usually  stems  from  former  historic  (colonial)  ties.  This  is  explains  the 
migration flows from India towards Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA; from 
countries  in  North  Africa  and  the  Middle-East  to  France;  from  Mozambique  to 
Portugal  and  from  Suriname  (and  other  Dutch-speaking  countries  such  as  South 
                                                 
44   Eastwood et al. (2005), Forcier et al. (2004).   23 
Africa) to the Netherlands. In an increasingly globalising world such historic patterns 
are  gradually  fading.  With  the  English  language  becoming  increasingly  an 
international language it is not surprising that the effects of medical migration on 
source countries are worst felt in English-speaking Sub-Saharan African countries, 
stemming from the “pull” of English speaking countries, especially the UK and North 
America.
45 
Countries in the EU are also likely to benefit from increased liberalisation of labour 
markets and mutual recognition of qualifications. In contrast to expectations this has 
so far not resulted in increased movement of health personnel due to linguistic and 
cultural barriers. However, since the enlargement of the EU in April 2004 with ten 
(much poorer) countries from Central and Eastern Europe there are signs that medical 
migration from countries including Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will gain 
in importance.
46  
Finally, the push and pull factors operate in a dynamic context. Once people have 
migrated from one area or country to another area or country, more people, family, 
friends or people from the same community, are likely to follow.
47 This is explained 
by the phenomenon that first-round migrants establish social networks which reduce 
the costs and risks of migration for those who follow.  
Consequences 
Consequences  of  medical  migration  can  be  subdivided  into  costs  and  benefits  for 
source  and  destination  countries.  The  overall  welfare  effects  will  depend  on  the 
interplay of several factors, which next to the change in the stock of human capital of 
source and destination countries, includes the amount of remittances flowing back 
from  destination  to  source  countries,  the  impact  on  labour  markets  in  source  and 
destination countries and the consequences for health service provision and the health 
status of the population in source and destination countries. 
                                                 
45   Eastwood et al. (2005). 
46   Bach (2006). See Buchan and Perfilieva (2006) for a survey of health worker migration in the EU. 
47   Bach (2003), Dovlo (2005), Stilwell et al. (2004), Padarath et al. (2004).   24 
Costs and benefits of medical migration for destination countries 
The benefits of inflows of health professionals for destination countries such as the 
UK are obvious; rather than having to train a doctor for 5 or 6 years at a cost of 
approximately £220,000 or a nurse at a cost of about £12,500 to fill up staff shortages, 
a migrant doctor or nurse is immediately available at zero cost.
48 In this way the UK 
has saved £65 million in training costs for the doctors and £38 million for the nurses it 
has taken from Ghana since 1998, while being able to maintain or increase health 
provision at the benefit of population welfare.
49  
Empirical evidence does not substantiate offsetting negative effects of migration on 
unemployment rates in destination countries: effects on wages are found to have been 
negative but small, and migrants seem to contribute more in taxes than they receive in 
social  security,  thereby  contributing  to  the  fiscal  system  and  economic  growth  in 
general in industrial countries.
50  
Costs and benefits of medical migration for source countries 
The costs of outflows of medical personnel to developing countries are also evident. 
Firstly, there is a human capital loss of educated and experienced personnel, with 
negative  spill-over  effects  on  those  who  remain.
51  UNCTAD  estimates  that  each 
migrating health professional represents a loss of US$184,000 to Africa, while at the 
same time it has unfilled vacancies and is forced to spend $4 billion on salaries of 
100,000 foreign experts which could be used to train and retain health professionals.
52  
The cost of training investment in health professionals has been estimated at US$60 
million for Ghana alone.
53 For South Africa, the estimated cost of training a doctor is 
approximately $97,000. For a nurse this amounts to $42,000, so that the overall loss 
of  the  investment  in  medical  education  may  be  estimated  at  approximately  US$1 
                                                 
48   Eastwood et al. (2005). Note that some migrant workers need additional language/professional training (Glover et al. 2001, 
Forcier et al. 2004). 
49   Mensah et al. (2005). Martineau et al. (2002) state that this may hinder the development of domestic health worker supply 
and speaks of the perverse incentive arising from the potential cost savings to underestimate the need of workers as the gap 
can be filled from overseas. Whereas migrant workers are willing to work in less popular areas, they do tend to go home for 
public holidays and are often being lured to other countries with competitive salaries complicating work force planning.  
50   Buchan et al. (2003), World Bank (2005a). Glover et al. (2001) estimate a net fiscal gain in 1998/99 for the UK of £2.6 
billion. The challenge of migration to local workers is equivalent to that imposed by imports of labour-intensive goods from 
developing countries, which could easily be compensated out of the overall welfare gain of migration (Winters, 2003b). 
51   These will be limited in case of temporary migration and in surplus countries such as India and the Philippines. 
52   Eastwood et al. (2005), Pang et al. (2002), Padarath et al. (2004). See World Bank (2005c) for an overview of the costs and 
benefits of migration for countries of origin. 
53   Martineau et al. (2002).   25 
billion, equivalent to a third of official development aid to South Africa over the 
period 1994-2000.
54 The loss of public subsidies for medical education is estimated at 
$500 million for all emigrating skilled workers from Africa.
55 These are just few of 
the many examples cited in the literature. Apart from these direct losses, there are 
second-round effects of reductions in quality and output of health care, achievement 
of health outcomes, tax revenues and economic growth.
56 
The  benefits  of  migration  for  the  source  countries  include  long  term  professional 
networks, improved training and skills of migrant workers which benefit the source 
country  in  terms  of  higher  productivity  upon  return  (absent  when  migration  is 
permanent), a rise in real wages for those staying behind and financial remittances 
from expatriates.
57 These benefits may be reduced if “brain waste” occurs and migrant 
health workers end up working outside the health sector or in lower skilled jobs in the 
country to which they move to.
58 Evidence of “brain gain” to those who stay behind in 
the  form  of  an  increased  incentive  to  enter  education  (in  view  of  the  migration 
opportunity and higher wages) suggests that this gain is limited.
59 The literature also 
suggests that migration may operate as a “safety valve” by reducing pressures for 
national governments to provide employment opportunities and benefits.
60
 
The evidence on remittances by medical migrants  
The evidence on the magnitude of world-wide remittance flows by migrant workers is 
mixed and difficult to establish since large proportions are transferred informally, and 
is therefore not recorded in official statistics. The World Bank estimates that in 2005 
total remittances world-wide exceeded US$232 billion, of which developing countries 
received  US$167  billion,  less  than  FDI  inflows  but  larger  (and  more  stable)  than 
capital market flows and official development assistance.
61 There is little information 
                                                 
54   Example drawn from Alkire and Chen (2004). 
55   Chen and Boufford (2005). 
56   Awases et al. (2004), Forcier et al. (2004), Stilwell et al. (2003), World Bank (2005a). 
57   Pang et al. (2002), Stilwell et al. (2003), Forcier et al. (2004).  
58   Bundred and Levitt (2000), Dovlo (2005), Pang et al. (2002), Martineau et al. (2002), World Bank (2005b, p. 208-210). 
59   World Bank (2005b, p. 208-210), Schiff (2005). 
60   Martineau et al. (2002)  cites a Ghanaian official who pointed out that if all 1500 doctors abroad returned, the government 
would  only  be  able  to  provide  employment  for  200  of  them.  Moreover,  Bach  (2003,  2006)  suggests  that  many  health 
professionals would not have stayed in the public health sector anyway. In this respect, Alkire and Chen (2004) and Skeldon 
(2005) point to the importance of wider policy failures. 
61   World Bank (2005c). Unrecorded flows are conservatively estimated to add at least 50% of official remittance flows.   26 
on  how  much  can  be  attributed  to  health  workers,  but  the  general  patterns  are 
described below.  
Health workers, who generally come from higher income households that are in lesser 
need of remittances and, in particular, those who migrate permanently seem to remit 
less than lower skilled short-term migrants.
62 Evidence suggests that doctors generally 
migrate permanently and so remit insignificant amounts, while nurses tend to migrate 
temporarily and remit a lot more.
63 Other studies point out that, while fewer high 
skilled  migrants  remit,  when  they  do  they  may  well  remit  more,  especially  when 
lucrative  investment  opportunities  are  involved.
64  More  importantly  however,  the 
magnitude of outward remittances largely depends on where migrants come from; 
countries such as China, India, Philippines, Egypt and Cuba, with a surplus of health 
professionals,  actively  send  them  abroad  since  remittances  are  considered  an 
important source of revenues. For the Pacific Islands of Tonga and Samoa the income 
from remittances is estimated to equal total GDP, and remittances by migrant nurses 
not only exceed those made by other migrants but also outweigh the cost of additional 
human  capital  in  nurse  training.
65  Similarly,  remittances  by  Philippine  physicians 
were  found  to  outweigh  economic  losses  of  emigration.
66  In  contrast,  recorded 
remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are highly volatile and comprise the lowest dollar 
amounts of any other poor world region (less than US$5 billion), primarily due to a 
high level of informal flows stemming from strong intraregional migration and an 
underdeveloped financial sector.
67 There are some exceptions, such as Nigeria which 
is said to receive remittances from Nigerians abroad in multiples of the amount of 
official development assistance to this country.
68 This suggests that remittance flows 
vary by country, as will the development impact. 
The evidence on the impact of medical migration on health service provision and health status 
It is all to easy to blame the health status crisis in many developing countries, in 
particular in Sub Saharan Africa, on the exodus of health workers. Some argue that it 
                                                 
62   Martineau et al. (2002), World Bank (2005a). 
63   Dovlo and Martineau (2004), Padarath et al. (2004). 
64   Lowell and Findlay (2002). 
65   Connell and Brown (2004).  
66   Forcier et al. (2004), Diallo (2004). 
67   Hagopian et al. (2004), Stilwell et al (2003), World Bank (2005a).  
68   Dovlo and Martineau (2004).   27 
is the lack of employment opportunities which generates out-migration in the first 
place.
69  As  shown  previously,  low  pay  and  lack  of  employment  prospects  are 
important push factors of medical migration.  Out-migration could therefore well be a 
symptom of deeper economic and political failures.  
The international migration of health workers from developing source countries to 
developed  destination  countries  does  pose  challenges  for  human  resource 
management and health service delivery, in particular for the former countries. The 
loss  from  migration  generally  outstrips  production  of  medical  personnel  in  these 
countries, which can be explained by a lack of medical schools.
70 In fact, human 
resources are often cited as the biggest constraint to health service expansion in both 
Northern developed and Southern developing countries.
71 As shown before, within the 
diverse group of developing countries, the extent of the brain drain is particularly felt 
by countries with relatively limited medical skill base, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa and 
small island economies of the Caribbean.
72 This is the so called “inverse care law”, 
that countries most in need of health care resources are getting the least (Figure 5).
73 
Figure 5 Global variation in the density of doctors, nurses and midwives 
  Source: Joint Learning Initiative (JLI, 2004), Figure 1.  Low density and high density clusters are divide into high and low 
under-five  mortality.  Among  low-density  countries,  45  are  in  the  low-density-high  mortality  category.  These  are 
predominantly countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                                 
69   Alkire and Chen (2004), Skeldon (2005). 
70   Hagopian et al. (2004). Awasas et al. (2004) shows that in some countries, including Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, South 
Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, the numbers of registered health professionals, apart from nurses, actually increased. 
71   Martineau and Dovlo (2004), Narasimhan et al. (2004). 
72   Eastwood et al. (2005), Mullan (2005), Skeldon (2005). 
73   Dovlo (2005).   28 
The  inverse  care  law  is  a  matter  of  concern  since  the  workforce  is  crucial  for 
advancing health. Recent reports by the WHO and the Joint Learning Initiative (JLI; a 
network of more than 100 global health leaders) show that health worker density is 
positively associated with immunization coverage, primary care service provision and 
infant, child and, most notably, maternal survival (Figure 6).
74 
Figure 6: Association between worker density and survival rates 
      Source: World Health Report 2006, Figure 1 
Consequently, for many countries the health-related Millennium Development Goals 
are likely to get even further out of reach. The WHO estimates that there are currently 
57 countries with critical health worker shortages. These countries are unable to meet 
the  health-related  Millennium  Development  Goals  in  2015.  The  deficit  for  these 
countries is estimated at 2.4 million doctors, nurses and midwives, compared to a 
global shortage of more than 4.3 million workers.
75 The burden falls relatively heavily 
on Sub-Saharan Africa, which has to triple its current numbers of health workers 
(equivalent to 1 million more health workers – including more than 600,000 nurses), 
whereas the absolute burden is greatest in South-East Asia.
76 The shortfall for doctors 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated by some to equal approximately 700,000 showing 
that  the  data,  while  giving  an  indication  of  the  scale  of  the  problem,  are  rather 
imprecise.
77 
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76   Data are drawn from JLI (2004) and are slightly higher than those provided by the WHO: the WHO (2006) estimates that 
Sub-Saharan Africa needs approximately 800,000 more health workers to reach the MDGs, an increase of 140%.  The figure 
for nurses needed in Sub-Saharan Africa is drawn from Buchan and Calman (2004). 
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With health service provision in source countries deteriorating due to the outflow of 
medical personnel, a self-sustaining vicious circle results in which medical migration 
increases  the  gap  between  working  and  living  conditions  between  source  and 
destination countries, thereby encouraging further migration. 
Overall welfare effects – the need for better data and quantitative studies 
The  overall  welfare  effects  of  medical  migration  on  source  countries,  destination 
countries  and  for  the  world  as  a  whole  depend  on  how  the  previously  discussed 
factors add up. The debate currently is polarised between the critics and proponents of 
medical  migration.
78  The  former  accuse  the  developed  countries  of  the  North  of 
“silent  theft”,  or  “acting  like  a  vacuum  cleaner”  of  or  “poaching”  labour  from 
developing countries of the South that can ill afford to lose health personnel. They 
stress  the  negative  health  externalities  caused  by  the  out-migration  of  individual 
health workers for which developing countries are not compensated. The latter are 
proponents  of  increased  globalisation,  including  free  trade  and  the  international 
movement of labour. They stress the right of individuals in enhancing their career and 
earnings’  opportunities,  the  benefits  from  remittances  and  the  benefits  from 
knowledge spill-over effects.  
Remittances, although benefiting the economy as a whole, are generally not thought 
of  as  making  up  for  the  human  capital  loss  of  medical  professionals  since  the 
repatriated income will not find its way into investments in health care given the lack 
of health professionals to do so.
79 Nevertheless, empirical studies to take into account 
such  broader  and  long-term  outcomes  into  consideration  are  lacking,  so  that  the 
overall welfare effects remain unclear. This prompts further quantitative research on 
the causes and consequences of medical migration and appropriate policy responses.
80 
It is evident that in order to carry out such research properly, data availability and 
monitoring  in  this  field  should  drastically  be  improved.  Since  the  causes  and 
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79   Eastwood et al. (2005), Hagopian et al. (2004), Martineau et al. (2002), Schrecker and Labonte (2004), Stilwell et al. (2003). 
80   Two forthcoming papers attempt to do this; the first from the receiving countries’ perspective, taking the UK as an archetype 
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consequences of medical migration are highly country-specific, outcomes are likely to 
differ per country.
81 
Trends and expectations for the future  
It was not feasible so far to comprehensively assess overall trends in the movement of 
health workers, since data for many countries was limited, incomplete or non existent. 
Nevertheless, since the earliest study on flow and stocks of physician and nurse labour 
force  in  40  countries  carried  out  by  the  WHO  in  1979
82,  the  mobility  of  health 
professionals is said to have increased, especially amongst nurses.
83 The (anecdotal) 
evidence presented in this section supports this observation.  
Whether  this  trend  will  continue  in  the  near  future  depends  on  whether  or  not 
governments  will  interfere,  unilaterally  or  via  multilateral  agreements,  so  as  to 
mitigate  the  negative  effects  of  medical  migration.  Even  so,  medical  migration  is 
likely to remain important given the continuing globalisation (facilitated by GATS 
mode IV), and given that push factors and pull factors are likely to grow in strength.
84  
A large “pull” is expected from richer countries due to forces such as the ageing of the 
population, including the health work force, new technologies and management of 
chronic diseases. For example, the WHO estimates that by 2008 Great Britain will 
need 25,000 more doctors and 250,000 more nurses than it did in 1997. Similarly the 
USA  will  need  more  than  one  million  additional  nurses  by  2020.  Canada  and 
Australia need 78,000 and 40,000 more nurses over the coming four to five years.
85  
Also  the  “push”  out  of  developing  countries  is  unlikely  to  diminish.  While  Sub-
Saharan  African  countries  are  doing  much  better  in  terms  of  economic  growth,
86 
prospects  for  economic  development  and  indeed  health  service  provision  need  to 
improve much more so as to weaken the push. Indeed, a recent synthesis report on 
migration of health professionals in six countries carried out by the WHO finds that a 
high proportion of health workers intends to emigrate, ranging from 26% in Uganda 
                                                 
81   UNFPA (2006), Dovlo (2005). 
82   Mejia et al. (1979). 
83   Alkire and Chen (2004), Bach (2006). 
84   Martineau et al. (2002). 
85   Data are taken from UNFPA (2006). 
86   Sub-Saharan  Africa  recorded  a  GDP  growth  of  4.6%  in  2005,  explained  by  very  strong  growth  amongst  resource-rich 
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to 68% in Zimbabwe.
87 While intention is not a solid predictor of future trends, it does 
form a cause for concern.  
5. The international policy agenda: from medical brain drain to brain gain 
Flows  of  workers  from  (developing)  source  to  (developed)  destination  countries 
depend not only on the push and pull factors encouraging health workers to migrate, 
but also on national and international migration policies. Political interference in the 
area of medical migration is motivated by the adverse impacts on resource-strapped 
African (and other poor) countries documented in the previous section. Policy makers 
need to carefully balance such policies with the universal right of individuals to move 
abroad to for personal gain, a right which should not be denied.
88 Given that in the 
future both push and pull factors are likely to remain important, it has been argued to 
take a positive stance towards medical migration and actively “manage” the migration 
flows  such  that  they  benefit  both  destination  and  source  countries.
89  Policies  to 
manage migration of health workers are directed towards push and pull factors so as 
to indirectly influence the extent of migration,  strengthen its positive impacts and 
mitigate its negative impacts. This section documents national and international policy 
options, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, that are currently in place or 
which are called for in the literature.
90   
Actions at the country level 
Since  both  push  and  pull  factors  are  involved,  ensuring  that  medical  migration 
benefits destination and source  countries  requires action from both developed and 
developing  countries.  Policies  typically  aim  at  increasing  the  training  of  medical 
personnel,  retaining  health  professionals,  especially  in  underserved  areas,  and 
promoting the return of migrant workers. We also briefly touch upon the role of codes 
of conduct, the contentious issue of compensation and how to increase (the impact of) 
remittance flows. Negative measures such as taxing migrants (a so-called ‘brain drain 
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tax’ proposed in the 1970s) or setting limits to the number of people that are allowed 
migrate are also mentioned in the literature but they are considered to be undesirable 
and ineffective for various reasons.
91 Firstly migrant income has already been taxed in 
the destination country such that taxing that income being remitted to the country of 
origin would ‘punish’ migrants twice. Secondly, such measures are unethical in that 
they impair individuals’ rights to move in search for better living and/or working 
conditions,    offer  no  long-term  solution  in  that  they  are  unlikely  to  address  the 
underlying  causes  (i.e.  the  push  and  pull  factors),  and  may  even  induce  illegal 
migration with its associated problems for both source and destination countries. 
Education and training of medical personnel 
A policy of educating and training medical personnel is required to reduce the number 
of unfilled vacancies in developing source countries and stem the pull from developed 
destination countries, in particular in the USA and the UK.
92 This policy takes time, 
but in the long term it is the only viable solution to resolving the human resource 
crisis in the health sector.
93 Moreover, Hagopian et al. (2004) found that most of the 
foreign trained physicians in the USA come from only a few Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries  and  are  trained  at  a  few  medical  schools,  suggesting  that  policy 
interventions in these few locations could be effective in stemming the brain drain. 
Some  argue  that  developed  countries  which  benefit  from  an  implicit  education 
subsidy  have  a  role  in  funding  of  medical  education  of  health  personnel  for 
developing countries (see also below).
94   
The literature suggests that the type of education and training also matters, since the 
current medical curriculum focuses too much on the needs of developed countries, 
thereby indirectly contributing to migration.
95 Developing source countries need to 
introduce much more basic training in order to train personnel with a skill mix that is 
appropriate for developing country needs. In this respect, Skeldon (2005) proposes 
some sort of “two-tier” education system in which doctors and nurses in developing 
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countries are trained to international standards - which may be lost to the international 
labour market - but with many others trained to much more basic levels to suit the 
needs of rural areas. Next to the question of whether a “two-tier” health system is 
desirable, it is likely not to solve the problem, since such half-trained would still form 
attractive recruits for developed countries.
96   
Improving retention and encouraging return 
Efforts to improve retention and encourage return apply not only at the national level 
but also at the regional level given that much of migration is from rural to urban areas 
and  from  the  public  to  the  private  sector.  Moreover  they  are  equally  relevant  for 
developed country health care systems.
97  
Retention and return policies typically focus on financial (wages, pensions) and non-
financial rewards to make living and working in the home country more attractive. 
The latter includes provision of adequate housing, means of transport, schooling for 
children,  adequate  equipment  and  medical  supplies,  safe  work  environments  and 
opportunities for further training. Furthermore, countries may create rules or enter into 
bilateral agreements which encourage temporary migration for a fixed period.
98 These 
are sometimes linked to training (e.g. via “bonding”) and staff exchanges (e.g. via 
“twinning”  between  hospitals)  and  all  serve  the  purpose  of  career,  personal  and 
organisational development.
99 Other initiatives try to make use of diaspora networks 
by  encouraging  emigrant  workers  to  engage  in  temporary  service  in  their  home 
countries whilst keeping their jobs abroad.
100  
Whereas the pay differential between migrant source and destination countries is an 
important reason for migration, the literature suggests that increasing wages alone will 
be ineffective in stemming the drain. According to Vujicic et al. (2004) nurse (doctor) 
pay differentials are highest for Zambia, Sierra Leone and Ghana  (Zambia, Ghana 
and  Cote  d’Ivoire)  and  lowest  for  South  Africa,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Cote 
                                                 
96   Eastwood et al. (2005). 
97   See also Simoens and Hurst (2006). 
98   For example, both India and the Philippines entered into bilateral agreements with the UK. See Eastwood et al. (2005). The 
Department of Health in the UK also signed bilateral recruitment agreements with Egypt, Spain and South Africa. See Bach 
(2006), WHO (2006). 
99   Buchan and Dovlo (2004), Dovlo and Martineau (2004), Simoens and Hurst (2006). 
100   Dovlo and Martineau (2004). The IOM programme on Migrartion and Development for Africa (MIDA) is such an example. 
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d’Ivoire (Mozambique, South Africa and Lesotho). Vujicic et al. (2004) nonetheless 
find little correlation between the supply of health care migrants and the size of the 
wage differential. This suggests that non-wage instruments (i.e. improving working 
and  living  conditions  in  source  countries)  might  be  more  effective  in  improving 
retention or encouraging return.
101 It is clear that these include policies that reach 
beyond the health sector and address broader issues of creating a stable political and 
macroeconomic environment conducive to economic growth.
102  
Ethical recruitment and codes of conduct 
Concerns about ethical recruitment led the UK to develop in 2001 a Code of Practice 
for International Recruitment by which it limits recruitment to the two countries with 
which it has signed a health worker-migration agreement (India and the Philippines) 
which allows for controlled migration of health personnel.
103 All other developing 
countries are on the so-called “proscribed list”, which will not be targeted for active 
recruitment by the NHS.
104 A major drawback of the original Code of Practice was 
that  it  did  not  cover  private  employers  and  recruitment  agencies,  which  led  the 
Department  of  Health  to  change  the  Code  in  2004.  The  impact  of  such  codes  of 
conduct is unclear. There have been continuing inflows of nurses from many countries 
that are on the proscribed list in the UK.
105 However, the recent decline in both nurse 
and doctor inflows into the UK from overseas may indicate that it is starting to take 
effect.
106 Developments in medical migration flows into the UK over the longer term 
will signify whether this is a one-off event or a sustained effect resulting from a more 
ethical recruitment process as governed by the Code of Practice.  
Lump-sum financial compensation for the loss of human capital and the role of bilateral aid 
At first sight, a compelling case exists for direct financial compensation of medical 
migrants who benefit developed countries’ health care systems, but have been trained 
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in source countries have little impact on migration flows. 
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in their countries of origin at considerable public expense. However, such financial 
compensation (known as restitution) does not address the underlying push and pull 
factors  governing  migration,  nor  is  it  politically  feasible  in  the  short  run.
107 
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine whom should be paid and by how much. The 
appropriate level of compensation would, among others, have to cover the cost of 
education and the loss of health services, lowered by increases in scientific knowledge 
and  remittances,  and  would  have  to  take  into  account  the  potential  return  of  the 
migrant, i.e. the length of stay.
108 However, such compensation, if properly managed, 
would create fiscal space for improved human resource management in developing 
country  health  care  systems  (i.e.  investing  in  training  of  health  personnel  and 
improved  working  and  living  conditions  of  medical  personnel  -  including  pay 
provided it doesn’t destabilise the rest of the economy).
109  
The aforementioned disadvantages of direct financial compensation can be overcome 
if it takes the form of bilateral aid, the amount being determined by developed country 
aid budgets.
110 In countries with good governance aid can be given in the form of 
budget  support  and  allocated  over  sectors  according  to  the  country’s  priorities, 
whereas in countries with poor governance aid can be targeted directly to the health 
sector. An additional advantage of increasing aid for health system development is 
that it is also likely to be relatively cheap compared to training doctors and nurses at 
home (though the latter is required in the long-run to address the problem of medical 
workforce shortages).
111 
There  are  concrete  proposals  for  funding  of  education  and  training  of  the  health 
workforce in developing countries. The Joint Learning Initiative (JLI, 2004) calls for 
the  creation  of  a  global  educational  reinvestment  fund  in  Southern  countries. 
Moreover, it recommends donors to harmonize their investments with a minimum of 
10% ($400 million) of the $4 billion spent worldwide on human resources for health 
                                                 
107   Eastwood et al. (2005), GCIM (2005). 
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109   Awasas et al. (2004), Mensah et al. (2005).  
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to strengthen strategic human capacities at the country level, and 10% of this ($40 
million) for regional and global resources. The World Health Organization (WHO, 
2006) recommends a 50:50 guideline, whereby 50% of all development assistance is 
devoted to health systems, with half of this geared towards strengthening the national 
health workforce. 
Increasing the quantity and development impact of remittances 
Although remittances provide some compensation for the loss of human capital by 
sending countries, they are often used for private consumption and usually do not 
benefit the health care system, such that, at least in the short-run, sending countries 
are  generally  considered  to  be  worse  off  from  medical  migration.  Also,  evidence 
suggests that the amount of remittances varies by skill type and duration of migration 
(higher skilled tend to migrate permanently and consequently remit less). Moreover, 
remittances  vary  by  the  migrant’s  country  of  origin:  particularly  in  Sub-Saharan 
Africa  remittance  levels  are  relatively  low  due  to,  among  others,  underdeveloped 
financial  markets.  While  the  decision  to  remit  is  one  of  individual  choice  which 
should  not  be  distorted  by  government  policy,  governments  do  have  a  role  in 
developing  financial  markets,  in  reducing  remittance  costs  by  encouraging 
competition  and  tackling  overregulation,  and  in  improving  the  overall  investment 
climate.
112 
The international institutional architecture related to medical migration 
At the international level, a number of institutions are active in the area of health 
worker migration. The World Bank, as a proponent of increased globalisation for the 
purpose of long-term economic growth, has in the past proposed that “health services 
are another area in which developing countries could become major exporters,..., by 
temporarily  sending  their  health  personnel  abroad.”
113  The  International  Labor 
Organization  (ILO),  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO),  the  International 
Organization  for  Migration  (IOM)  and  the  independent  Global  Commission  on 
International Migration (GCIM) also acknowledge the importance of labour migration 
in general for the world economy, but have expressed their concern about the impact 
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of medical labour migration in undermining the performance of health systems and 
the achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals.
114  
The role of GATS Mode 4 
International migration of health personnel is expected to gain momentum in future 
through progress within the negotiations on Mode 4 of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). GATS Mode 4, 
by which services can be traded via the movement of natural persons, relates to the 
provision of health services by individuals in another country on a temporary basis.
115  
There  are,  however,  several  problems  with  the  current  formulation  of  Mode  4.
116 
Firstly,  the  term  “temporary”  has  been  defined  only  negatively  as  excluding 
permanent migration and there is no international consensus on the definition. This 
could  be  to  the  benefit  of  source  countries  by  limiting  the  time  for  which  health 
workers can go abroad and so reducing the possibility of permanently losing costly 
human  capital.  However,  the  term  “temporary”  may  not  entail  much  significance 
since is difficult to enforce in practice: temporary workers, once they have migrated, 
may  be  unwilling  to  move  back  to  their  home  country  after  their  contracts  have 
finished and may become permanent residents (to the point where they disappear into 
illegality).  
Secondly, persons are seen as service providers, not as entrants to the labour market. 
This distinction is difficult to maintain in practice since a temporary residency often 
implies that the service provider will have entered the local labour market. This, and 
the modest commitments made on Mode 4 so far (currently accounting for only 1.4% 
of the value of services trade), can be explained by the fear of (developed) countries 
that  they  may  lose  their  ability  to  regulate  immigration  and  the  fear  of  potential 
negative impacts on the national economy.  
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Thirdly,  the  GATS  framework  allows  for  domestic  regulations  regarding  the 
requirements to practice of health professionals in order to safeguard the quality and 
safety  of  health  service  provision.  These  act  as  a  barrier  to  entry  by  health 
professionals to developed host countries so as to protect the income of domestic 
health professionals. In some cases requirements regarding qualification and licences 
are said to have led to discrimination against foreign physicians.
117 More generally, 
GATS service liberalisation is typically biased towards liberalising the movement of 
highly  skilled  personnel,  rather  than  creating  new  employment  opportunities 
worldwide  for  the  unskilled,  an  area  of  comparative  advantage  for  developing 
countries.  This  may  however  benefit  the  health  sector,  since  it  is  relatively  skill-
intensive. 
Despite  these  problems  and  the  limited  progress  so  far,  expectations  are  high  for 
future  progress  in  the  area  of  international  medical  migration  since  there  is  a 
continuing  momentum  towards  the  enlargement  of  regional  trade  blocks  and  the 
harmonisation of medical qualifications worldwide. The WTO recognises that in this 
process  there  will  be  benefits  from  surplus  countries  filling  up  gaps  in  shortage 
countries and more generally benefits of lower health care prices worldwide, but also 
risks of brain drains exacerbating health personnel shortages and problems of access 
to  and  the  quality  of  health  services  in  developing  countries.
118  The  WTO  thus 
recommends  that  countries  impose  appropriate  regulations  so  that  national  health 
policy goals are not undermined by trade in health services.
119  
International codes of conduct for ethical recruitment 
International  organisations  other  than  the  WTO  have  attempted  to  draw  up  and 
strengthen codes of practice.
120 Ratification by all members, however, often does not 
materialise  since  the  priorities  of  destination  and  source  countries,  cost-effective 
international recruitment and a more equitable terms of trade respectively, are found 
to be incompatible. The Commonwealth has for example adopted a Code of Practice 
                                                 
117   Forcier et al. (2004). 
118   WTO-WHO (2002).  
119   GATS  for  example  allows  sending  countries  to  discourage  medical  migration  via  negative  measures,  such  as  taxing 
emigrating personnel or demanding financial compensation from recruiting countries/organisations, and positive measures, 
such as better employment/living conditions at home. Since  most developing countries have insufficient regulatory and 
enforcement capacity to do so, strengthening their regulatory capacity is a major challenge for the coming years.  
120   See also Willetts and Martineau (2004).   39 
in  2003,  though  Canada,  Australia  and  the  UK  have  not  signed  the  agreement, 
seemingly  due  to  the  addition  of  clauses  related  to  compensation  for  countries  of 
origin.
121 All in all, while voluntary codes of practice, such as that of the UK and the 
Commonwealth,  allow  governments  to  display  ethical  international  recruitment 
behaviour, they are relatively weak regulatory mechanisms because they have no legal 
standing.
122  Many  see  it  as  a  starting  point,  a  benchmark  by  which  international 
recruitment behaviour can be monitored.
123 
The way forward: calls for a global framework for the management of skills migration 
As a long-term solution, there are calls for an overhaul of the institutional migration 
architecture  by  creating  an  international  framework  consisting  of  all  relevant 
stakeholders which is to govern international skills migration.
124 GCIM for example 
proposes  the  establishment,  in  2006,  one  Inter-agency  Global  Migration  Facility 
responsible for all migration policies to create a more effective and coherent response 
to the opportunities and challenges posed by international migration. As a short-term 
solution a high-level inter-institutional group could pave the way for such a facility.
125 
Similarly, the 2006 World Health Assembly announces the creation of the Global 
Health  Workforce  Alliance  in  2006,  which  is  to  support  countries  in  building  an 
effective  health  workforce  during  the  coming  decade.  Specific  targets  include  the 
formulation of a strategic national workforce plan by all countries within five years, 
substantial increases in education and training of the work force and the improvement 
of workforce strategies.
126  
How  such  proposals  will  affect  international  medical  migration  remains  as  yet 
unknown. However, the increased collaborative work on migration of health workers 
between  a  number  of  international  agencies,  including  the  IOM,  WHO,  ILO,  the 
Commonwealth,  OECD,  World  Bank,  and  UN  institutions,  but  also  with  non-
governmental  organisations,  private  initiatives  and  national  governments,  within 
structures  such  as  the  Joint  Learning  Initiative  and  the  Global  Health  Workforce 
                                                 
121   Bach  (2006),  Buchan  and  Dovlo  (2004),  Eastwood  et  al.  (2005),  Nullis-Kapp  (2005).  See  Bach  (2003)  for  more  on 
international standards and trade agreements. 
122   Bach (2006). 
123   Ahmad (2005), WHO (2006a). 
124   See for example Ahmad (2005), Dovlo (2005), JLI (2004), Pang et al. (2002). 
125   GCIM (2005). 
126   WHO (2006, 2006a).   40 
Alliance, is commendable since it harmonises the collection of data, improves the 
knowledge  base  and  ensures  better  management  and  alignment  of  policies  at  the 
country level compared to separate approaches. Figure 7 summarises how increased 
international cooperation can accelerate progress in managing medical migration. It 
shows that effective international cooperation should be country-led for the purpose of 
increasing  country  ownership,  but  also  since  country-specific  problems  require 
country-specific solutions. 
Figure 7: An international framework for managing medical migration 
 
    Source: World Health Report 2006, Figure 5 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper presented an overview of the evidence and applied literature on medical 
migration.  
The applied literature overwhelmingly finds global welfare gains from international 
migration,  with  developing  countries  gaining  especially  from  (temporary)  out-
migration of unskilled labour in which they are relatively abundant. The impact of 
liberalising  the  movement  of  skilled  workers  on  global  (and  developing  country) 
welfare is a lot less clear due to the more likely to be permanent loss of scarce human 
capital, i.e. the brain drain from developing to developed countries. On top of that the 
medical brain drain is likely to have associated adverse (positive) health provision, 
health  and  welfare  consequences  for  developing  source  (developed  destination) 
countries, an aspect which has not been explicitly quantified so far.  
The evidence suggests that, while medical migration flows are multi-directional both 
within and across countries, particularly English-speaking countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Caribbean with a relatively small base of health workers and high 
burden of disease suffer from the medical brain drain to the benefit of a few English-
speaking countries in the North, most notably the UK and the USA. This is worrying 
since the workforce is crucial for advancing health, so that for many of these countries 
the health-related Millennium Development Goals get further out of reach.  
The  overall  welfare  effects  for  source  and  destination  countries  depend  on  the 
interplay of several factors. These include changes in the stock of human capital, the 
amount  of  remittances,  the  labour  market  impacts  and  changes  in  health  care 
provision and the health status of the population. While remittances are generally not 
thought of as making up for the human capital loss of medical professionals, empirical 
studies to take into account all short-term and long-term impacts are lacking so that 
the overall welfare effects for source and destination countries remain unclear. This 
prompts  further  quantitative  research  on  the  causes  and  consequences  of  medical 
migration  and  appropriate  policy  responses.  In  order  to  carry  out  such  research 
properly, data  availability and monitoring of medical migration flows needs to be   42 
drastically improved. Since the causes and consequences of medical migration are 
highly country-specific, results and policy implications are likely to differ per country. 
The global welfare gains from migration may well fall and inequalities across regions 
may  rise  when  accounting  for  population  health  effects  associated  with  the 
international movement  of health workers. This is because the health  and welfare 
gains of an influx of health workers into developed countries with relatively well-
functioning health care systems are likely to be insufficient to compensate for the 
adverse  health  and  welfare  consequences  of  the  loss  of  scarce  health  workers  for 
developing  countries  where  (well-)  functioning  health  care  systems  are  usually 
lacking and where the burden of disease is high. Again this presumption needs to be 
tested by further quantitative research. 
Political interference in the area of medical migration is motivated by the negative 
external effects on resource-strapped African (and other poor) countries. Since it is the 
individual’s right to move and since the underlying push and pull factors are likely to 
remain important, the policy approach has been one that aims to manage rather than 
restrict medical migration flows so that they benefit destination and source countries. 
The policy agenda for destination and source countries includes measures to:  
•  increase  the  education  and  training  of  medical  personnel  and  change  the 
medical curriculum in developing countries so that it suits their needs; 
•  improve the retention of health professionals, especially in underserved areas 
and promote the return of migrant workers; 
•  and increase (impact of) remittances.   
Retention and return will require a mix of financial and non-financial rewards to make 
living  and  working  in  the  home  country  or  region  more  attractive.  Policies  in 
developing countries often need to reach beyond the health sector due to wider policy 
failures of poor country governance and economic collapse. Countries may also create 
rules or enter into bilateral agreements which encourage temporary migration for a 
limited  period.  These  could  be  linked  to  training  or  staff  exchanges  and  include   43 
initiatives of diaspora networks to involve emigrant workers in capacity building in 
their home countries.  
While  direct  financial  compensation  of  medical  migrants  to  compensate  for  the 
implicit education subsidy of medical migration from developing source to developed 
destination countries is generally not recommended, there is a valid and strong moral 
argument for increased financial and non-financial support for strengthening human 
resource  management  in  developing  country  health  care  systems.  The  WHO 
recommends  a  50:50  guideline,  whereby  50%  of  all  development  assistance  is 
devoted to health systems, with half of this geared towards strengthening the national 
health workforce.  
At the international level, voluntary codes of conduct, such as that of the UK and the 
Commonwealth,  have  provided  a  benchmark  by  which  international  recruitment 
behaviour can be monitored. Since they have no legal standing they provide only a 
starting point for improved ethical recruitment behaviour. International institutions, 
including the UN, WB, IMF, WTO, WHO, ILO, IOM and GCIM, have the leverage 
to do so. However, while health worker migration is expected to gain moment in the 
future through progress with negotiations within the WTO on GATS Mode 4, little 
progress  has  been  made  so  far.  Also,  cooperation  with  and  between  the  other 
institutions needs improving.  
The  way  forward  is  generally  seen  as  one  of  concerted  action  by  all  relevant 
stakeholders, which is country-led and accords to a commonly agreed international 
framework to manage medical migration flows so that brain drains are turned into 
gains. Proposals include the creation of an Inter-agency Global Migration Facility. A 
recent step forward is the creation of the Global Health Workforce Alliance in 2006 
which aims to support countries in building an effective health work force. How such 
initiatives  will  affect  medical  migration  flows  remains  as  yet  unknown.  However, 
increased collaborative work on migration of health workers is needed to harmonise 
the collection of data, improve the knowledge base and ensure better management and 
alignment of policies at the country-level so that brain drains are turned into gains.    44 
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